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Different Wars Require Different Strategies:
Separating the “War on Drugs” from the “War on Drug [Traffickers]”
by Liana Eustacia Reyes, J.D., M.A., Florida International University

Abstract
Using the securitization framework to highlight the arguments that facilitated the
“War on Drugs”, this paper highlights a separate war against drug traffickers.
Facilitated by ideology through the rhetoric promoted by the “War on Drugs,” the
fear of communist expansion and democratic contraction, the “War on Drug
Traffickers” was implemented, requiring its own strategy separate from the “War
on Drugs.” This is an important distinction because the play on words changes the
perception of the issue from one of drug addiction to one of weak institutions and
insurgent/terrorist threat to those institutions. Furthermore, one cannot propose
strategy to win, lose, or retreat in a war that one has been unable to identify
properly. And while the all-encompassing “War on Drugs” has motivated
tremendous discourse on its failure and possible solutions to remedy its failure,
the generalizations made as a result of the inability to distinguish between the
policies behind drug addiction and the militarized policies behind drug trafficking
have discounted the effect of violence perpetrated by the state, the rationale for
the state perpetrating that violence, and the dependence that the state has on
foreign actors to perpetrate such violence. This makes it impossible to not only
propose effective strategy but also to persuade states that participate in the “War
on Drug Traffickers” to adopt the proposed strategy.

Liana Eustacia Reyes

Introduction
The “War on Drugs” is a rhetorical war that has been popularly categorized as
United States (U.S.) drug prohibition in the 20th century. Looking beyond its
name, is it attached to militarized drug prohibition? Military engagement must
occur for a “war” to occur, and drugs cannot be personified to the extent
necessary to actually go to war with them. Yet around the world countries1 have
implemented militarized counter-narcotics policies that are separate from the
supply/consumption policies of the “War on Drugs.” This takes the “War on
Drugs” from rhetoric to military strategy and expands it to include a “War on
Drug Traffickers.” The distinction is necessary because one cannot propose a
strategy to win, lose, or retreat in a war that one has been unable to properly
identify.
The all-encompassing “War on Drugs” has motivated tremendous discourse on its
failure and possible solutions to remedy its failure. The generalizations made as a
result of the inability to distinguish between the policies behind drug addiction
and the militarized policies against drug trafficking have discounted the effect of
violence perpetrated by the state, the rationale for the state perpetrating that
violence, and the dependence that the state has on foreign actors to perpetrate
such violence. The lack of consideration for their rationale to perpetrate violence
and their dependence on foreign actors perpetrating such violence would result in
a failed proposition.

The lack of consideration for the effects of violence

perpetrated by the state would result in an inefficient policy.

Without the

distinction between these wars and the considerations involved with their
distinction, it is impossible to not only propose effective strategy but also to
persuade states involved in the “War on Drug Traffickers” to adopt any proposed
strategy.
The purpose of this paper is to distinguish between the “War on Drugs” and the
resulting “War on Drug Traffickers” so that the implementation, rationale for
1

The terms “countries” and “states” are used interchangeably throughout this paper.
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implementation, and effects of implementation of the resulting militarized drug
policies can be studied. The goal of this research is to dissect the motivating
factors for extreme counter-narcotics policies to effectively strategize how to
transition from such policies. Since this paper is at the foundational level of this
research, it is focused on the U.S. as the popularly cited creator of the “War on
Drugs.”
To understand the rationale behind going to war with drug traffickers and the
implementation of the militarized counter-narcotics policies that invoke the “War
on Drug Traffickers,” a historical analysis was conducted of former President
Richard Nixon’s drug policy and of former President Ronald Reagan’s National
Security Decision Directives. The most influential arguments and intelligence
that dictated – or at the very least molded – the argument for the resulting
militarized counter-narcotics policies was highlighted. As a result, this paper
finds that former President Ronald Reagan was the influential actor of the
“Speech Act” that changed the discourse in drug policy facilitating its expansion.2
This paper first begins with the framework used to conduct this historical
analysis, Buzan, Waever, and Wilde’s (1998) “In Security: A New Framework for
Analysis.”3 The framework is used to highlight the change in discourse, also
known as the securitizing moves in which the United States expanded the “War
on Drugs” to include a “War on Drug Traffickers.” Second, this paper will use
that framework to detail how the “War on Drug Traffickers” came to fruition and
why it is separate from the “War on Drugs.” Further research to understand what
drove countries around the world to militarize their counter-narcotics policies
should be conducted to understand not only what drove these countries, but what
commonalities these countries share among each other and the U.S. Although
research into the motivating factors that facilitated implementation of the “War on
Drug Traffickers” has not been conducted, this paper will end with a discussion
2

This paper at no point discounts the covert operations conducted by the U.S. in other countries,
but only focuses on the military operations that were conducted after the drug trade was articulated
as a national security threat.
3
Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, 1998.
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on the possible motivating factors that proposed policies must take into
consideration.
Theoretical Framework of Buzan, Waever, and Wilde (1998):
Politicization/Securitization
Traditionally, the security of a state could only be threatened by another state.4
This limitation allowed for extreme threats such as military engagement to come
from a state only. As a result, security issues were easily identified because they
were always stemming from states whose political agendas, assertions or acts
could be noted as a threat to another state. During the Cold War, security threats
were expanded beyond states to include non-traditional threats of individual
citizens/non-citizens, organizations, and drug traffickers.

Identifying threats

became more difficult because they began to come from anyone or anything. To
control for those endless possibilities, Buzan, Weaver, and Wilde (1998) created
the “securitization” framework. For this paper to identify what promoted the
threat of a drug trafficker to be equal to the threat of another state, the study
would have to be conducted within this framework. This section will focus on the
securitization framework so that the following sections can use the framework to
sift through the “War on Drugs” progression and expansion into the “War on
Drug Traffickers.”
For non-traditional security threats, the securitization framework establishes the
process of a threat going from a minimal social threat to an existential state threat
resulting in extreme policies such as military action. This framework allows for a
non-traditional security threat that becomes a national security threat to be studied
and properly identified. The framework is the following:
(1) a claim made by the securitizing actor that something is
existentially threatening some valued referent object; (2) the
securitizing actor’s audience holds value to that referent object and
accepts the claim made by the securitizing actor; and (3) that
audience allows for the implementation of extreme tactics (such as

4

Andreas and Price, 2001, 31-52.
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military engagement) by the securitizing actor to protect their valued
referent object.5
This is also known as the Speech Act in which the proper actor’s speech gains
consent from the authorizing audience to implement extreme policies.6 The key to
securitization is for the speech to gain acceptance so that the audience will allow
the speaker to implement extreme policies. In other words:
Securitization […] does not simply come into being when one
actor declares an existential threat; this is merely the securitizing
move. Instead, a securitization exists only at the point when a
designated audience accepts the speech act. Securitization is
thus both a performative speech act, whereby in speaking
security it is done, as well as an intersubjective process between
the securitizing actor and an audience. Once an issue has been
‘accepted’ by an audience, a securitizing actor is in the position
to evoke emergency measures and go beyond established rules in
an effort to address the threat. ‘Securitization is fulfilled […] by
cases of existential threats that legitimize the breaking of rules.7
For the state to use its own military to domestically go on the offense and/or
defense with drug traffickers, the state must perceive that drug traffickers are an
existential threat.

But the “…discourse that takes the form of presenting

something as an existential threat to a referent object does not by itself create
securitization-this is a securitizing move…”, hence the “War on Drugs.”8 Noting
the discourse is key for pinpointing the time that drug policy shifted into the
military sector and most importantly for noting the motivating factors for the
resulting militarized counter-narcotics policies.
Before the securitization of drug traffickers can occur, and before the expansion
of perceived threats that motivate drug policy to militarize can occur, drugs
themselves have to be lifted from the social realm to the political realm, allowing
for their threat to be felt by actual decision makers.

Politicized issues are

“…(part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocations

5

As stated above, this framework is derived from Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, 1998.
See Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, 1998.
7
Floyd and Croft, 2011, 155.
8
Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, 1998, 25.
6
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or, more rarely, some other form of communal governance)…”9 For the audience
to be introduced and begin accepting the claim that the state, its referent object,
was/is being threatened by drug traffickers requiring the implementation of
militarized counter-narcotics policies, the supply of drugs would have to be
politicized; also known as the securitizing move discussed above.10 This explains
how the policy regarding narcotics became political and rose to the level requiring
military action.
The following sections will put this framework to use while exploring the
securitizing moves that led to the “War on Drug Traffickers.” The next section
will use this framework to establish why the “War on Drugs” was a successful
securitizing move that led to the securitization of drug traffickers around the
world. A discussion of why the “War on Drugs” did not complete the framework
but instead became the securitizing move for the “War on Drug Traffickers” will
show that not only are we dealing with completely separate issues, but we are
dealing with issues that require completely separate strategies and policies.
Background: Beginning with the “War on Drugs”
Former President Richard Nixon is recognized for his contributions with initiating
the “War on Drugs.” In 1971, he stated that “America’s public enemy number one
. . . is drug abuse” and “[i]n order to fight and defeat this enemy, it is necessary to
wage a new, all-out offensive.”11 At this point, the claim was an attempt by the
executive of a state to place drug abuse, or the commodities that people abuse, as
the number-one threat to that state. To “wage a new, all-out offensive” would
seem to signal the Speech Act requirement for securitization especially since
policies were implemented, or at least referenced as being implemented, because
of former President Richard Nixon’s speech.12 His speech, however, was focused
on demand issues such as rehabilitation. The goal was to assist our military
9

Id. at 23.
The politicization of these drug suppliers is the securitizing move that facilitates the
securitization of drug traffickers.
11
Nixon, 1971, 202 (Remarks About an Intensified Program for Drug Abuse Prevention and
Control).
12
Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, 1998, 26.
10
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stationed abroad, in particular Vietnam,13 while also assisting society as a whole
from succumbing to the hardships of drug addiction.
Drugs had been taken from the social realm and placed in the political realm
allowing for the resulting rehabilitative, judicial, and police remedies to be put in
place. Former President Richard Nixon established the Special Action Office of
Drug Abuse Prevention within the Executive Office as a “central authority with
overall responsibility for all major Federal drug abuse prevention, education,
treatment, rehabilitation, training, and research programs in all Federal
agencies.”14 Drugs had been effectively politicized and elevated into the executive
branch. Although the resulting policies would involve executive control of drug
policy and obstructing the ability to invoke some rights such as the “no-knock
searches,” actual military engagement or intrastate war did not occur, meaning
that securitization did not occur.15
For years, drugs were deemed an uncontrollable threat with no discriminatory
qualities and only horrifying effects for those who consumed them. Society as a
whole was at this social issue’s mercy.

Former President Richard Nixon’s

categorizing of drugs as an addictive threat with no discriminatory qualities would
allow the U.S. to begin securitizing this group of commodities due to the resulting
fear of not knowing who its next victim would be – a fear potentially experienced
by the securitizing audience.16 However, the inability of a person, let alone a state,
to go on the offensive with a commodity, regardless of its personification,

13

In his speech, Nixon notes that “Vietnam … has brought to our attention the fact that a number
of young American have become addicts as they serve abroad…” Nixon, 1971, 202.
14
Nixon, 1971, 203 (Special Message to the Congress on Drug abuse Prevention and Control).
15
See Floyd and Croft, 2011, 161 “The analyst using securitization theory must not focus on what
security, is, but only on what it does – because what is done in the name of security is tantamount
to the meaning of security.”
16
See Andreas, Bertram, Blachman, and Sharpe, Winter 1991-1992, 160: “The spread of crack
cocaine and the dramatic escalation of drug-related violence in the 1980s led first Ronald Reagan
and then George Bush to "declare war" on drugs. By the end of the decade, more Americans
identified drugs as the number-one threat to the country than any other problem.” For even more
detail on the U.S. perception of drugs, see The White House National Drug Control Strategy,
September 1989.
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prevents drugs from fitting the securitization framework as a securitized issue in
the military sector, and leaves it in the political sector as a politicized issue.
Even though drugs themselves are unable to fit within the framework for
securitization, their politicized threat is successful enough to facilitate the
securitization of its suppliers now placing drug traffickers within the scope of
review for a securitized threat. This is still an incredible political move because
the claim for an all-out offensive was, prior to former President Richard Nixon’s
declaration, a claim traditionally made against another state and/or government.17
Up until that point, the claim was only being made against communism and/or
communist states. Therefore, former President Richard Nixon placed drugs in the
realm of a state threat that needed to be offensively attacked because it would
have severe consequences for anyone and everyone. This meant that the door was
officially open to a new area of U.S. and international security: political drug
control.18
Former President Richard Nixon’s speech facilitated the supply reduction policies
that would begin looking at “source countries” versus focusing only on domestic
consumption. He specifically noted:
America has the largest number of heroin addicts of any nation in
the world. And yet, America does not grow opium-of which
heroin is a derivative--nor does it manufacture heroin, which is a
laboratory process carried out abroad. This deadly poison in the
American life stream is, in other words, a foreign import.19
The growing belief was that the U.S. alone could not solve its problem at home.
The fact that drugs originated in foreign countries required the cooperation of
foreign governments to allow the U.S. to prevent their drugs from infiltrating U.S.
borders.20 Policies that followed would involve a shift in the military sector at
home and abroad.

17

See Buzan, Waever, and Wilde, 1998.
For further discussion on the military sector see Id at 49-70.
19
Nixon, 1971, 203 (Special Message to the Congress on Drug abuse Prevention and Control).
20
Bartilow and Eom, 2009, 93-116 (Citing The Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Force 1975:
50) .
18
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This next section focuses on placing President Ronald Reagan’s National Security
Decision Directives within the securitization framework.

Although former

President Richard Nixon did not securitize the issue of drugs, former President
Ronald Reagan continued on this path securitizing the threat of those who traded
drugs. The following establishes how the “War on Drug Traffickers” came to be.
Discussion: The Securitization of Drug Traffickers and the Resulting War
In 1986, former President Ronald Reagan in his National Security Decision
Directive Number 221 made the Speech Act – a textually intricate argument that
causally linked drugs to a trade that destabilized democratic states and/or
democracies. He argued that the ability for the drug trade to fund not only
criminal trafficking organizations but also insurgents and terrorist groups that
were attempting to overthrow their/a democratic state/democracy was an
existential threat to U.S. National Security and democracy as a whole.21 This
argument by former President Ronald Reagan solidified, through documentation22
and unilateral action,23 that the rhetorical “War on Drugs” would encompass an
actual “War on Drug Traffickers” facilitated by ideology and fear: a precursor to
the “War on Terror.”
What had previously consumed the position of threat to the U.S., other states,
became equalized with an individual’s exploitation of a commodity.

The

unilateral act of a President to link the supply of drugs to drug traffickers that
were also simultaneously behaving as insurgents and/or terrorists attempting to
overthrow democratic governments and/or democracy is noteworthy when one
acknowledges that at the time, U.S. identity was very much pro-democracy, antiterrorist, anti-insurgent, and most importantly, anti-Soviet.24 This sharing of threat
capability between states, insurgents, terrorists, and drug traffickers to

21

Reagan National Security Decision Directive Number, 1986, 221.
For more on National Security Decision Directives, their importance, power, and use by former
President Reagan, See Dwyer, 2002, 411-413; Gordon, 2007, 351-366; and Newman, 2001, 81.
23
Gordon, 2007, 350.
24
See Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006, 161; For a deeper look into U.S. ideology and the history of
foreign policy, or even the rise of the National Security Doctrine, also see Andreas and Price,
2001, 37-51 and Queiser Morales, July 1989, 147-153.
22
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existentially threaten democracy and/or democratic states not only expanded U.S.
National Security, appropriation ceilings, disbursements, and Foreign Policy, but
it internationally shifted political relationships, limitations to sovereignty, foreign
aid, and ultimately the relationship between a state and a non-state actor.25 This
would take the rhetoric of the “War on Drugs” and turn it into actual strategy for
implementing the “War on Drug Traffickers.”
As Rita Floyd and Stuart Croft (2011) note, “[p]rovided that the securitization is
successful, the analyst can then identify the emergency measures that follow.”26
This next section will discuss the resulting emergency measures that followed the
securitization of drug traffickers. Further research is necessary to study the states
that implemented such emergency measures, the relationship they share with one
another, and the relationship they share with the United States.
The “War on Drug Traffickers”
National Security Decision Directive Number (NSDD) 221 was the Speech Act
that securitized drug traffickers. The NSDD itself was a speech tool used by
former President Ronald Reagan that gave him the authority to unilaterally act,
create National Security policy, and have the force of law.27 Former President
Ronald Reagan’s audience, U.S. Congress, responded in the form of this strong
act with the implementation of policies that ranged from the 1986 Anti-Drug
Abuse Act to militarized policies in Latin American States. Peter Andreas (2006)
stated that “by the end of the 1990s, antidrug programs represented more than 92
percent of U.S. military and police aid to the Western hemisphere.”28
Although National Security strategy had primarily been focused on the
Soviet threat since former President Ronald Reagan’s NSDD 32, it expanded to

25

See Congressional Reports: Storrs, April 8, 1998; Perl, 2006; Wyler, 2011; Also see Bartilow
and Eom, 2009, 93-116; Lindau, 2011, 177-200; Falco, 1995, 15; Ayling, 2005, 376-383; and
Sciolino, 1988.
26
Floyd and Croft, 2011, 173.
27
Dwyer, 2002, 411.
28
Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006.
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include narcotics trafficking by NSDD 221. In NSDD 221, former President
Reagan articulated:
The international drug trade threatens the national security of the
United States by potentially destabilizing democratic allies. It is
therefore the policy of the United States, in cooperation with
other nations, to halt the production and flow of illicit narcotics,
reduce the ability of insurgent and terrorist groups to use drug
trafficking to support their activities, and strengthen the ability of
individual governments to confront and defeat this threat.29
NSDD 221 placed drug trafficking within the offices of the Department of
Defense – drug trafficking was now legitimately within the military sector of the
U.S. 30 A few months later, NSDD 238 replaced NSDD 32 as the primary source
of U.S. National Security Strategy.31 The trafficking of illicit drugs as a U.S.
National Security threat would continue to evolve from NSDD 221 making its
way into NSDD 238 as an official component of National Security Strategy
solidifying that the threat had transitioned from the political sector to the military
sector.32
The Western hemisphere was the focal region for former President Ronald
Reagan’s NSDD 221. According to former President Ronald Reagan, “[w]hile
these problems are endemic to most nations plagued by narcotics, their effects are
particularly insidious for the democratic states of the Western Hemisphere.”33
Before NSDD 221, former President Ronald Reagan had made it clear that the
Western Hemisphere was a focal point for avoiding Soviet expansion, terrorism
and insurgencies. He had asserted that “U.S. national interests in Latin America
and the region dictate policies that achieve the following objectives: a region free
of Soviet-dominated or hostile environments.”34 To do so required that our
policies be focused on “radical insurgent movements supported by the Soviet

29

Reagan National Security Decision Directive Number, 1986, 221.
Id.
31
Reagan National Security Decision Directive Number, 1986, 238.
32
Id.
33
Reagan National Security Decision Directive Number, 1986, 221.
34
See Reagan National Security Decision Directive Number, 1986, 71.
30
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Union and/or its surrogates.”35 The focus on Soviet influence in the Western
Hemisphere, insurgencies and terrorists backed by the Soviet Union, coupled with
the new threat of drug trafficking as a funding stream for these groups, promoted
the threat of drug trafficking to a U.S. National Security threat.36
Former President Ronald Reagan saw the federal government as an institution to
deal with drugs through foreign policy, and looked to the states and local
governments to deal with drug consumption through local laws.37 He was
influenced by the “cocaine wars” in Miami, crack addiction in New York, and a
booming drug industry within the early 1980s that was showing spectacular
growth during an “…increasing economic crisis…”38 He was also influenced by
the term “narcoterrorism” that was introduced in 1983 by then Peruvian President
Belaúnde Terry.

Although former President Richard Nixon is noted for

establishing the “War on Drugs,” the credit for the “War on Drug Traffickers”
belongs to former President Ronald Reagan. While the Nixon Administration was
focused on the addictive qualities of drugs, the Reagan Administration, focused
on the Soviet threat,39 found that countries losing their democratic transitions
were supplying drugs. The presence of leftist/Marxist insurgents or terrorists,
who were all simultaneously behaving as drug traffickers attempting to overthrow
the democratic process gave the necessary evidence to facilitate the securitization
of drug traffickers and shift the “War on Drugs” from rhetoric to military strategy.
Two military operations that have been discussed in reference to the resulting
militarized counter-narcotics policies in Latin America with U.S. military
assistance are Operations Snowcap and Operation Blast Furnace.

Operation

Snowcap “involved extensive coordinated military operations in Guatemala,
Panama, Costa Rica, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador,
Bolivia, Peru, and Mexico” with chemical control, vehicle interdiction and marine
35

Reagan National Security Decision Directive Number, 1982, 71.
Reagan National Security Decision Directive Number, 1984, 138 and Reagan National Security
Decision Directive Number, 1985, 179.
37
Benoit, 2003, 283.
38
Vellinga, 2004.
39
See Reagan National Security Decision Directive Number, 1982, 32.
36
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law enforcement interdiction operations all conducted to suppress coca.40
Operation Blast Furnace, utilizing American and Bolivian military personnel,
launched a series of raids against cocaine laboratories in Bolivia.41 By 1989, the
military could arrest drug traffickers and fugitives on foreign territory
with/without the host country’s authorization.42 As Andreas and Nadelmann
noted, “drug enforcement became the defining feature of post-cold war U.S.
military relations with many of its southern neighbors.”43
The U.S. international counter-narcotics policy has been characteristically defined
as having a strong military perspective.44 In 1986, drug trafficking was declared a
national security threat by former President Ronald Reagan, requiring the U.S. to
act in its most defensive and offensive manner with military intelligence,
interdiction, and aerial spraying, among other things. Three years later, former
President George Bush defined an Andean strategy that included an active role of
U.S. armed forces (Pentagon and Southern Command) and those of the Andean
countries in the combat against drug trafficking.45 The Reagan Administration’s
policy would intensify, continue, and further pressure/assist Latin American
countries under The Bush and Clinton Administrations with Plan Colombia, and
following with the GW Bush Administration’s Andean Initiative in 2001.46
Foreign governments adhered to “…U.S. pressure by creating specialized drug
enforcement agencies, adopting U.S. style investigative techniques, signing
extradition treaties with the U.S., hosting U.S. law enforcement agents within
their borders and have adopted U.S. approaches to criminal law and drug
enforcement.”47 In the end, former President Ronald Reagan’s NSDD 221 would
be the Speech Act resulting in not only the securitization of drug traffickers, but
also a war that expanded the rhetorical war requiring any counter-narcotics
40

Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006.
Id. at 164.
42
Id. at 164.
43
Andreas and Nadelmann, 2006.
44
Valderrama and Cabieses, 2004, 53.
45
Id.
46
Astorga in Vellinga, 2004, 93; and see Perl, 2006, 15-16.
47
Bartilow and Eom, 2009, 93-116.
41
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policies proposed thereafter to properly identify which counter-narcotics war it
was attempting to deal with. This section has established how the rhetorical “War
on Drugs” expanded to include the actual “War on Drug Traffickers.” This next
section will focus on why proper identification of the issues matter in the context
of counter-narcotics policies.
Implications
This research highlights a different war that was facilitated by ideology through
the rhetoric promoted by the “War on Drugs,” fear of communist expansion, and
fear of democratic contraction, requiring its own study and strategy separate from
the “War on Drugs.” With a strong Soviet threat still looming, drug addiction
booming, leftist/Marxist insurgent/terrorist drug traffickers threatening insecure
democratic institutions, perceived to be weak democratic allies, and a geopolitical
focus on the western hemisphere, the environment was set to facilitate the
implementation of militarized policies that created the “War on Drug
Traffickers.” This is an important distinction because the play on words changes
the perception of the issue from one of drug addiction to one of weak institutions
and insurgent/terrorist threat to those institutions.
One cannot propose strategy to win, lose, or retreat from a war that one has been
unable to identify properly. The “War on Drugs” has motivated tremendous
discourse on its failure and possible solutions to remedy its failure, but the
generalizations made as a result of the inability to distinguish between the policies
behind drug addiction and the militarized policies behind drug trafficking have
discounted the effect of violence perpetrated by the State, the rationale for the
State perpetrating that violence, and the dependence that State has on foreign
actors to perpetrate such violence. This makes it impossible to not only propose
effective strategy but also persuade States that participate in the “War on Drug
Traffickers” to adopt the proposed strategy.
Ironically, “[t]he drug war hinders fundamental democratic institutional
development, or more accurately, fosters the expansion of non-democratic
14

Liana Eustacia Reyes

institutions and practices.”48 Currently, many states are struggling with this
reality. But, what motivated these states to implement these militarized counternarcotics policies? It is difficult to argue that these states were overwhelmed by
drug addiction, as they would have followed in former President Richard Nixon’s
footsteps with rehabilitative policies.
Policies that involve military engagement between the state and drug traffickers
suggests other motivating factors such as a lack of institutional capacity, lack of
state structure, insecurity, corruption and/or lack of trust with the judiciary and
police - issues that may not be affected by consumption policies such as
rehabilitation or decriminalization. If the motivating factors are lack of trust with
the judiciary, for example, then the proposed policy should be a transnational
trafficking court or other global assistance program that these states can lean on to
develop their institutional capacity. While this does not discount consumptionfocused policies, this paper merely asserts that more than consumption, or supply,
or trafficking policies are necessary to deal with the underlying issues of current
militarized drug policies. Most importantly, this paper asserts that the motivating
factors must be studied in implementing states before strategy and policy is
proposed.
Conclusion
The “War on Drugs” is arguably the most successful slogan, before the “War on
Terror,” to imply a strategic decision to politically engage absolutely nothing in
particular. Yet it led to the strategic decision to militarily engage someone in
particular. The brilliance in this was the ability of the slogan to take a group of
commodities, converge them all under one label, victimize their consumer,
criminalize or even demonize their supplier and therefore profiteer, while also
creating a savior status for the holder of that slogan. Even more brilliant was the
ability of that slogan’s holder to expand that threat into a funding-stream for
insurgents and terrorists threatening our democratic allies providing the ability for

48

Lindau, 2011, 177-200.
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engagement

to

occur

militarily

between

the

state

and

the

now

criminalized/demonized supplier/profiteer of those commodities.
However, this brilliant slogan is dimming out as it continues to suffer some
serious blows to its reputation. The “War on Drug Traffickers” has never been
distinguished, resulting in a lack of attention with the insecurities that led to
militarized counter-narcotics policies around the world. While it was once a
vibrant and aggressive slogan, its lifeline seems shorter than ever before,
requiring states that have embraced the “War on Drugs” to decide where they go
next. But to understand the trajectory of this war, its estimated life expectancy,
and/or even possible reincarnation, one must understand the states actively
participating within that war and its expanded war, the “War on Drug
Traffickers.”
The U.S. arguably holds a dominant position within the implementation of
prohibitionist counter-narcotics policies. The relation of implementing states to
the creator of the “War on Drugs” is one that may implicate the type of global
policy expansion that occurred among these states.

Further studies must be

conducted to provide a thorough analysis into the securitizing moves of these
states and their dependency on the U.S., each other, as well as competitiveness
with one another, and possible socialization or prior inclination to militarized
policies. A focus on the dependency these states have with the U.S. asserts that
any prediction as to the implementing state’s future moves would have to involve
the recognition of the implementing state’s sentiment toward the U.S. since the
implementing state will either retaliate against the U.S. or continue to align itself
with the U.S. The motives behind implementation are keys to understanding
where these states have gone with drug policy, where they are now, and where
they might go tomorrow.
Active participants within the “War on Drugs” have been labeled as
participants/victims under the now labeled failing U.S. “War on Drugs.” The
unraveling of instability in these states, what many believe to be the result of
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these failed policies, has socially diminished the notion that the “War on Drugs”
can be won. A push for ending their part, or anyone’s part, in the “War on Drugs”
has become the headline catcher for today. These advocates may be failing to
recognize the inability for these states to follow suit with their media blitz and
retreat from the “War on Drugs” because of their inability to deal with the drug
trafficking opponent through other democratic means due to the lack of
institutional capacity within the judiciary and police that motivated their
participation with the “War on Drug Traffickers.”
The “War on Drug Traffickers” involves a play on words that forces the
policy maker to perceive a different threat, and rightfully so, because the policies
already implemented were based on different threats.

Decriminalization and

legalization do not address issues such as political and economic dependence,
insecurity, conflict, or even geopolitical wants/needs.

The difference in wars

equates to difference in policies, difference in consequences, and difference in
motivations. While the “War on Drugs” may be focused on the addictive qualities
of drugs, the “War on Drug Traffickers” is most certainly not focused on the
addictive qualities of drugs. An understanding of why is essential to dealing with
that why effectively.
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